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a b s t r a c t 
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games, 
where a player would keep cooperation to avoid being retaliated by a co-player in the future. So- 
called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies enable a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between 
the player’s own payoff and the co-player’s payoff regardless of the strategy of the co-player. In the 
present study, we analytically study zero-determinant strategies in ﬁnitely repeated (two-person) pris- 
oner’s dilemma games with a general payoff matrix. Our results are as follows. First, we present the 
forms of solutions that extend the known results for inﬁnitely repeated games (with a discount factor 
w of unity) to the case of ﬁnitely repeated games (0 < w < 1). Second, for the three most prominent ZD 
strategies, the equalizers, extortioners, and generous strategies, we derive the threshold value of w above 
which the ZD strategies exist. Third, we show that the only strategies that enforce a linear relationship 
between the two players’ payoffs are either the ZD strategies or unconditional strategies, where the lat- 
ter independently cooperates with a ﬁxed probability in each round of the game, proving a conjecture 
previously made for inﬁnitely repeated games. 
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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0. Introduction 
The prisoner’s dilemma game models situations in which two
ndividuals are involved in a social dilemma and each individual
elects either cooperation (C) and defection (D) in the simplest set-
ing. Although an individual obtains a larger payoff by selecting D
egardless of the choice of the other individual, mutual defection,
hich is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, yields a smaller
eneﬁt to both players than mutual cooperation does. We now
now various mechanisms that enable mutual cooperation in the
risoner’s dilemma game and other social dilemma games ( Nowak,
006; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Sigmund, 2010 ), which inform us
ow cooperation is probably sustained in society of humans and
nimals and how to design cooperative organisations and society. 
One of the mechanisms enabling mutual cooperation in social
ilemma games is direct reciprocity, i.e., repeated interaction, in
hich the same two individuals play the game multiple times.
n individual that defects would be retaliated by the co-player
n the succeeding rounds. Therefore, the rational decision for
oth players in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game is to keep
utual cooperation if the number of iteration is suﬃciently large
 Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971 ). Generous tit-for-tat∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: naoki.masuda@bristol.ac.uk (N. Masuda). 
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022-5193/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.  Nowak and Sigmund, 1992 ) and win-stay lose-shift (often called
avlov) ( Kraines and Kraines, 1993; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993 )
trategies are strong competitors in evolutionary dynamics of the
epeated prisoner’s dilemma game under noise, and a population
omposed of them realizes a high level of mutual cooperation. 
In 2012, when the study of direct reciprocity seemed to be
atured, Press and Dyson proposed a novel class of strategies
n the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, called zero-determinant
ZD) strategies ( Press and Dyson, 2012 ). ZD strategies impose a
inear relationship between the payoff obtained by a focal indi-
idual and its co-player regardless of the strategy that the co-
layer implements. A special case of the ZD strategies is the equal-
zer, with which the focal individual unilaterally determines the
ayoff that the co-player gains regardless of what the co-player 
oes, within a permitted range of the co-player’s payoff value (see
oerlijst et al., 1997 and Sigmund, 2010 for the previous accounts
or this strategy). As a different special case, the focal individual
an set an “extortionate” share of the payoff that the individual
ains as compared to the co-player’s payoff. The advent of the ZD
trategies has spurred new lines of investigations of direct reci-
rocity. They include the examination and extension of ZD strate-
ies such as their evolution ( Adami and Hintze, 2013; Akin, 2017;
hen and Zinger, 2014; Hilbe et al., 2013a; 2013b; 2015b; Liu et al.,
015; Stewart and Plotkin, 2012; Szolnoki and Perc, 2014a; 2014b;
u and Rong, 2014; Xu et al., 2017 ), multiplayer games ( Hilbe
t al., 2014b; 2015b; Milinski et al., 2016; Pan et al., 2015; Stewart
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pet al., 2016 ), continuous action spaces ( McAvoy and Hauert, 2016;
2017; Milinski et al., 2016; Stewart et al., 2016 ), alternating games
( McAvoy and Hauert, 2017 ), human reactions to computerized ZD
strategies ( Hilbe et al., 2014a; Wang et al., 2016 ), and human-
human experiments ( Hilbe et al., 2016; Milinski et al., 2016 ). 
Most of the aforementioned mathematical and computational
studies of the ZD strategies have been conducted under the as-
sumption of inﬁnitely repeated games. While mathematically more
elegant and advantageous, ﬁnitely repeated games are more real-
istic than inﬁnitely repeated games and comply with experimental
studies. In the present study, we examine the ZD strategies in the
ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. There are a few studies
that have investigated ZD strategies in ﬁnitely repeated games.
Hilbe and colleagues deﬁned and mathematically characterized ZD
strategies in ﬁnitely repeated games ( Hilbe et al., 2015a ) (also see
Hilbe et al., 2014a ). McAvoy and Hauert analyzed ZD strategies
in the ﬁnitely repeated donation game (i.e., a special case of
the prisoner’s dilemma game) in a continuous strategy space
( McAvoy and Hauert, 2016; 2017 ). Given these studies, our main
contributions in the present article are summarized as follows.
First, we derive expressions for ZD strategies in ﬁnitely repeated
games that are straightforward extensions of those previously
found for the inﬁnitely repeated game. Second, for the three most
studied ZD strategies, we derive the threshold discount factor
(i.e., how likely the next round of the game occurs in the ﬁnitely
repeated game) above which the ZD strategy can exist. Third,
we prove that imposing a linear relationship between the two
individuals’ payoffs implies that the focal player takes either the
ZD strategy deﬁned for ﬁnitely repeated games ( Hilbe et al., 2015a )
or an unconditional strategy (e.g., unconditional cooperation and
unconditional defection), proving the conjecture in Hilbe et al.
(2013b) in the case of ﬁnitely repeated games. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, we explain the ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game, the strategies of interest (i.e., memory-one strate-
gies), and the expected payoffs. More thorough discussion of them
is found in Nowak et al. (1995) , Sigmund (2010) and Hilbe et al.
(2015a ). 
We consider the symmetric two-person prisoner’s dilemma
game whose payoff matrix is given by 
( C D 
C R S 
D T P 
)
. (1)
The entries represent the payoffs that the focal player, denoted by
X , gains in a single round of a repeated game. Each row and col-
umn represents the action of the focal player, X , and the co-player
(denoted by Y ), respectively. We assume that 
T > R > P > S, (2)
which dictates the prisoner’s dilemma game. Both players obtain
a larger payoff by selecting D than C because T > R and P > S . We
also assume that 
2 R > T + S, (3)
which guarantees that mutual cooperation is more beneﬁcial than
the two players alternating C and D in the opposite phase, i.e., CD,
DC, CD, DC, . . . , where the ﬁrst and second letter represent the
actions selected by X and Y , respectively ( Axelrod, 1984; Rapoport
and Chammah, 1965 ). The two players repeat the game whose
payoff matrix in each round is given by Eq. (1) . A next round
given the current round takes place with probability w (0 < w < 1),
which is called the discount factor. Consider two players X and Y that adopt memory-one strate-
ies, with which they use only the outcome of the last round
o decide the action to be submitted in the current round. A
emory-one strategy is speciﬁed by a 5-tuple; X ’s strategy is
iven by a combination of 
p = (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) (4)
nd p 0 , where 0 ≤ p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD , p 0 ≤1. In Eq. (4) , p CC is the
onditional probability that X cooperates when both X and Y co-
perated in the last round, p CD is the conditional probability that
 cooperates when X cooperated and Y defected in the last round,
 DC is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X de-
ected and Y cooperated in the last round, and p DD is the condi-
ional probability that X cooperates when both X and Y defected in
he last round. Finally, p 0 is the probability that X cooperates in the
rst round. Similarly, Y ’s strategy is speciﬁed by a combination of 
 = (q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD ) (5)
nd the probability to cooperate in the ﬁrst round, q 0 , where
 ≤ q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD , q 0 ≤1. 
We refer to the ﬁrst round of the repeated game as round 0.
ecause both players have been assumed to use a memory-one
trategy, the stochastic state of the two players in round t ( t ≥0)
s speciﬁed by 
 (t) = ( v CC (t ) , v CD (t ) , v DC (t ) , v DD (t ) ) , (6)
here v CC ( t ) is the probability that both players cooperate in round
 , v CD ( t ) is the probability that X cooperates and Y defects in round
 , and so forth. The normalization is given by v CC (t) + v CD (t) +
 DC (t) + v DD (t) = 1 ( t = 0 , 1 , . . . ). The initial condition is given by 
 (0) = ( p 0 q 0 , p 0 (1 − q 0 ) , (1 − p 0 ) q 0 , (1 − p 0 )(1 − q 0 ) ) . (7)
ecause the expected payoff to player X in round t is given by
 (t) S  
X 
, where 
 X = (R, S, T , P ) , (8)
he expected per-round payoff to player X in the repeated game is
iven by 
X = (1 − w ) 
∞ ∑ 
t=0 
w t v (t) S  X . (9)
he transition-probability matrix for v ( t ) is given by 
 = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
p CC q CC p CC (1 − q CC ) (1 − p CC ) q CC (1 − p CC )(1 − q CC ) 
p CD q DC p CD (1 − q DC ) (1 − p CD ) q DC (1 − p CD )(1 − q DC ) 
p DC q CD p DC (1 − q CD ) (1 − p DC ) q CD (1 − p DC )(1 − q CD ) 
p DD q DD p DD (1 − q DD ) (1 − p DD ) q DD (1 − p DD )(1 − q DD ) 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ . 
(10)
y substituting 
 (t) = v (0) M t (11)
n Eq. (9) , one obtains 
X = (1 − w ) v (0) 
∞ ∑ 
t=0 
(wM) t S  X 
= (1 − w ) v (0)(I − wM) −1 S  X , (12)
here I is the 4 ×4 identity matrix. Similarly, the expected
er-round payoff to player Y is given by 
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o  Y = (1 − w ) v (0)(I − wM) −1 S  Y , (13) 
here 
 Y = (R, T , S, P ) . (14) 
. Results 
We search player X ’s strategies that impose a linear relationship
etween the two players’ payoffs, i.e., 
πX + βπY + γ = 0 . (15) 
hen α  = 0, we set χ = −β/α and κ = −γ / (α + β) to transform
q. (15) to 
X − κ = χ(πY − κ) . (16) 
.1. Equalizer 
.1.1. Expression 
By deﬁnition, the equalizer unilaterally sets the co-player’s
ayoff, πY , to a constant value irrespectively of the co-player’s
trategy ( Boerlijst et al., 1997; Press and Dyson, 2012; Sigmund,
010 ). To derive an expression for the equalizer strategies in the
nitely repeated game, we proceed along the following idea: If
 strategy p ensures that the payoffs of the two players are on
 horizontal line in the πX − πY space, irrespective of the co-
layer’s strategy, then the payoffs must be on that horizontal line
f the co-player uses unconditional cooperation or unconditional
efection. Substituting the co-player’s unconditional coopera-
ion and unconditional defection into the payoff formulas gives
ecessary conditions imposed on X ’s strategy. A straightforward
omputation then shows that these necessary conditions are in
act often suﬃcient; even if the co-player uses strategies that are
ot unconditional cooperation or defection, the two payoffs lie on
he same line. We will use the same idea in Section 3.2 as well. 
Because the equalizer is equivalent to α = 0 in Eq. (15) and
ence not covered by Eq. (16) , we start by rewriting Eq. (13) as
ollows: 
Y = ( 1 − w ) v ( 0 ) u eq 
= ( 1 − w ) ( p 0 q 0 , p 0 ( 1 − q 0 ) , ( 1 − p 0 ) q 0 , ( 1 − p 0 ) ( 1 − q 0 ) ) 
×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
u eq 
1 
u eq 
2 
u eq 
3 
u eq 
4 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
= ( 1 − w ) 
[
p 0 q 0 u 
eq 
1 
+ p 0 ( 1 − q 0 ) u eq 2 
+ ( 1 − p 0 ) q 0 u eq 3 + ( 1 − p 0 ) ( 1 − q 0 ) u eq 4 
]
, (17) 
here 
 
eq = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
u eq 
1 
u eq 
2 
u eq 
3 
u eq 
4 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎠ ≡ (I − wM) −1 S  Y . (18) 
e denote u eq when Y ’s strategy is q = (0 , 0 , 0 , 0) by u eq, 0 0 0 0 .
ote that u eq, 0 0 0 0 is independent of the probability that Y co-
perates in the initial round, i.e., q 0 . We denote by πY , 0 0 0 0 the
ayoff of Y when q = (0 , 0 , 0 , 0) . Similarly, we denote u eq when
 ’s strategy is q = (1 , 1 , 1 , 1) by u eq, 1111 and by πY , 1111 the payoff
f Y when q = (1 , 1 , 1 , 1) . The expressions of u eq, 0 0 0 0 , πY , 0 0 0 0 ,
 
eq, 1111 , and πY , 1111 are given in Appendix A . If X applies an
qualizer strategy, πY, 0 0 0 0 = πY, 1111 must hold true regardless of
 . Therefore, we obtain 0 (1 − w )[ p 0 q 0 u eq , 0 0 0 0 1 + p 0 (1 − q 0 ) u eq , 0 0 0 0 2 + (1 − p 0 ) q 0 u eq , 0 0 0 0 3 
+(1 − p 0 )(1 − q 0 ) u eq , 0 0 0 0 4 ] 
= (1 − w )[ p 0 q 0 u eq , 1111 1 + p 0 (1 − q 0 ) u eq , 1111 2 
+(1 − p 0 ) q 0 u eq , 1111 3 + (1 − p 0 )(1 − q 0 ) u eq , 1111 4 ] , (19) 
hich leads to 
 0 [ p 0 (u 
eq , 0 0 0 0 
1 
− u eq , 1111 
1 
) − p 0 (u eq , 0 0 0 0 2 − u eq , 1111 2 ) 
+(1 − p 0 )(u eq , 0 0 0 0 3 − u eq , 1111 3 ) − (1 − p 0 )(u eq , 0 0 0 0 4 − u eq , 1111 4 )] 
+[ p 0 (u eq , 0 0 0 0 2 − u eq , 1111 2 ) 
+(1 − p 0 )(u eq , 0 0 0 0 4 − u eq , 1111 4 )] = 0 . (20) 
q. (20) must hold true for arbitrary 0 ≤ q 0 ≤1. Therefore, we
btain 
p 0 (u 
eq , 0 0 0 0 
1 
− u eq , 1111 
1 
) + (1 − p 0 )(u eq , 0 0 0 0 3 − u eq , 1111 3 ) = 0 , (21) 
p 0 (u 
eq , 0 0 0 0 
2 
− u eq , 1111 
2 
) + (1 − p 0 )(u eq , 0 0 0 0 4 − u eq , 1111 4 ) = 0 . (22) 
ombination of Eqs. (18) , (21) , and (22) leads to the following
ecessary conditions: 
p CD = 
p CC (T − P ) − ( 1 w + p DD )(T − R ) 
R − P , (23) 
p DC = 
( 1 
w 
− p CC )(P − S) + p DD (R − S) 
R − P , (24) 
nd p CC , p DD , and p 0 are arbitrary under the constraint 0 ≤p CC , p CD ,
 DC , p DD , p 0 ≤1. Eqs. (23) and (24) extend the results previously
btained for w = 1 ( Press and Dyson, 2012 ). 
Surprisingly, Eqs. (23) and (24) are also suﬃcient for p to be an
qualizer strategy. In other words, if a strategy of player X satisﬁes
qs. (23) and (24) , then every co-player Y ’s strategy, not restricted
o unconditional cooperation or unconditional defection, yields the
ame payoff of Y . To verify this, we substitute 
p = 
(
p CC , 
p CC (T − P ) − ( 1 w + p DD )(T − R ) 
R − P , 
( 1 
w 
− p CC )(P − S) + p DD (R − S) 
R − P , p DD 
)
(25) 
nd q = (q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD ) in Eq. (18) to obtain 
 
eq = 1 
(1 − w )(1 − wp CC + wp DD ) 
×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
w (1 − p CC ) P + (1 − w + wp DD ) R 
w (1 − p CC ) P + (1 − w + wp DD ) R 
(1 − wp CC ) P + wp DD R 
(1 − wp CC ) P + wp DD R 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ , (26) 
hich does not contain q . By substituting Eq. (26) in Eq. (17) , we
btain 
Y = 
(1 − p 0 + wp 0 − wp CC ) P + (p 0 − wp 0 + wp DD ) R 
1 − wp CC + wp DD 
, (27) 
hich is independent of q and q 0 . Therefore, the set of the equal-
zer strategies is given by Eq. (25) , where 0 ≤p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ≤1,
ombined with any 0 ≤p 0 ≤1. 
It should be noted that an equalizer does not require any
ondition on p 0 . However, Eq. (27) indicates that the payoff
hat an equalizer enforces on the co-player, πY , depends on
he value of p 0 . Because Eq. (27) is a weighted average of P
nd R with non-negative weights, an equalizer can impose any
ayoff value πY such that P ≤πY ≤R . If P is enforced, it holds
hat p 0 − wp 0 + wp DD = 0 , and hence p DD = p 0 = 0 . Therefore,
he equalizer is a cautious strategy (i.e., never the ﬁrst to co-
perate) ( Hilbe et al., 2015a) . If R is enforced, it holds that
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Fig. 1. Region in the p CC –p DD space where the equalizer strategy exists (shaded re- 
gion). The border line of the half plane speciﬁed by Eqs. (30) and (31) are shown 
by the solid and dashed lines, respectively. We set R = 3 , T = 5 , S = 0 , P = 1 , and 
w = 0 . 8 . 
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I1 − p 0 + wp 0 − wp CC = 0 , and hence p CC = p 0 = 1 . Therefore,
the equalizer is a nice strategy (i.e., never the ﬁrst to detect)
( Hilbe et al., 2015a) . We remark that the equalizer is a ZD strategy
for ﬁnitely repeated games as deﬁned in Hilbe et al. (2015a) be-
cause it satisﬁes Eq. (31) of Hilbe et al. (2015a) with α = 0 . 
3.1.2. Minimum discount rate 
In this section, we identify the condition for w under which
equalizer strategies exist. Eq. (25) indicates that an equalizer
strategy exists if and only if 
0 ≤ p CC (T − P ) −
(
1 
w 
+ p DD 
)
(T − R ) ≤ R − P (28)
and 
0 ≤
(
1 
w 
− p CC 
)
(P − S) + p DD (R − S) ≤ R − P (29)
for some 0 ≤p CC , p DD ≤1. Note that we used Eq. (2) . Independently
of w , any pair of p CC and p DD satisﬁes the second inequality of
Eq. (28) and the ﬁrst inequality of Eq. (29) because they are satis-
ﬁed in the most stringent case, i.e., p CC = 1 and p DD = 0 . The ﬁrst
inequality of Eq. (28) and the second inequality of Eq. (29) read 
p DD ≤ T − P 
T − R p CC −
1 
w 
(30)
and 
p DD ≤ P − S 
R − S p CC −
1 
w 
P − S 
R − S + 
R − P 
R − S , (31)
respectively. Eqs. (30) and (31) specify a p CC − p DD region in
the square 0 ≤p CC , p DD ≤1, near the corner (p CC , p DD ) = (1 , 0)
(shaded region in Fig. 1 ). The feasible set ( p CC , p DD ) monotonically
enlarges as w increases. Therefore, we obtain the condition under
which an equalizer exists by substituting p CC = 1 and p DD = 0 in
Eqs. (30) and (31) , i.e., 
w ≥ w c ≡ max 
(
T − R 
T − P , 
P − S 
R − S 
)
. (32)
When w = w c , the unique equalizer strategy is given by p CC = 1 ,
p DD = 0 , and either p CD or p DC is equal to zero, depending on
whether (T − R ) / (T − P ) is larger than (P − S) / (R − S) or vice
versa. The condition w ≥ (T − R ) / (T − P ) in Eq. (32) coincides withhat for the GRIM or tit-for-tat strategy to be stable against the
nconditional defector ( Axelrod, 1984 ). 
Eq. (32) is consistent with the result for the continuous dona-
ion game ( McAvoy and Hauert, 2016 ). Their result adapted to the
ase of two discrete levels of cooperation is w c = c/b, where b and
 are the usual beneﬁt and cost parameters in the donation game,
espectively. We verify that Eq. (32) with R = b − c, T = b, S = −c,
nd P = 0 yields w c = c/b. 
.2. General cases 
All strategies but the equalizer in which a linear relationship
s imposed between πX and πY are given in the form of Eq. (16) .
n this section, we derive expressions of X ’s strategy that realizes
q. (16) . 
By substituting Eqs. (12) and (13) in Eq. (16) , we obtain 
(1 − w ) v (0)(I − wM) −1 S  X − κ
= χ
[
(1 − w ) v (0)(I − wM) −1 S  Y − κ
]
. (33)
q. (33) yields 
 (0) 
{
(1 − w )(I − wM) −1 
[
S  X − χS  Y 
]
+ (χ − 1) κ1 
}
= 0 , (34)
here 
 = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ . (35)
e set 
 
zd = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
u zd 1 
u zd 2 
u zd 3 
u zd 4 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎠ ≡ (1 − w )(I − wM) −1 
[
S  X − χS  Y 
]
+ (χ − 1) κ1 . 
(36)
hen, Eq. (34) is rewritten as 
 (0) u zd = 0 , (37)
hich is equivalent to 
 0 
[
p 0 u 
zd 
1 − p 0 u zd 2 + (1 − p 0 ) u zd 3 − (1 − p 0 ) u zd 4 
]
+ 
[
p 0 u 
zd 
2 + (1 − p 0 ) u zd 4 
]
= 0 . (38)
ecause Eq. (38) must hold true irrespectively of q 0 , we require 
p 0 u 
zd 
1 + (1 − p 0 ) u zd 3 = 0 , (39)
p 0 u 
zd 
2 + (1 − p 0 ) u zd 4 = 0 . (40)
et us denote by u zd, 0 0 0 0 and u zd, 1111 the vector u when
 = (0 , 0 , 0 , 0) and q = (1 , 1 , 1 , 1) , respectively. The expressions
f u zd, 0 0 0 0 and u zd, 1111 are given in Appendix B . By substituting
 
zd, 0 0 0 0 and u zd, 1111 in Eqs. (39) and (40) , we obtain the four
ecessary conditions, Eqs. (91) –(94) , given in Appendix B . 
If we assume κ − S + χ(T − κ)  = 0 , we can rewrite
q. (92) as 
p DD 
= (1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] + (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1)(κ − P ) 
w [ κ − S + χ(T − κ) ] . 
(41)
f we assume T − κ + χ(κ − S)  = 0 , we can rewrite Eq. (93) as 
G. Ichinose, N. Masuda / Journal of Theoretical Biology 438 (2018) 61–77 65 
− 1) κ − wp DC (χ − 1) R 
. (42) 
W S) = 0 later in this section. 
tion containing p CD , p DC , p 0 , κ , and χ as unknowns. This equation can 
b n two types of solutions. The one type of solution is given by 
 − S − wp CD (χ − 1) κ
) κ + T − χS ] 
1)(κ − P ) 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (43) 
E e substitute Eq. (43) in Eq. (36) to obtain 
u (44) 
w  (37) . Therefore, Eq. (43) is a set of strategies that impose the linear 
r
 deﬁned in Hilbe et al. (2015a) , which is veriﬁed as follows. Assume 
t sponds to the equalizer. Then, let us substitute α = φ, β = −φχ, and 
γ enerality. Note that this transformation is a bijection because (i) φ > 0 
a be et al. (2015a ), φ > 0 and χ < 1 because their χ is deﬁned as the 
r
w (45) 
w bined with 
φ (46) 
i tends Eq. (9) of Chen and Zinger (2014) , which has been obtained for 
w
41) and (42) in Eq. (91) is given by 
(47) 
S or 
(48) 
T
κ (49) 
a
χ (50) 
H condition for Eq. (37) to hold true for arbitrary q and q 0 . Therefore, we 
a 0 , 0 , 0 , 1) , which we denote by u zd, 10 0 0 and u zd, 0 0 01 , respectively. The 
c
(51) 
 a suﬃcient condition for Eq. (16) to hold true for arbitrary q and q 0 , 
w
up CC = 
− (1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) R + T − χS ] + T − χS + (1 + wp DC )(χ
w [ T − κ + χ(κ − S) ] 
e will deal with the case κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 or T − κ + χ(κ −
By substituting Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (91) , we obtain an equa
e factorized. By equating each of the two factors with 0, we obtai
p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
(1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) R + S − χT ] − (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1) R + χT
w [ κ − S + χ(T − κ) ] 
p CD 
− (1 − w ) p 0 (χ + 1)(T − S) + (1 − wp CD ) [ (χ − 1
w [ κ − S + χ(T − κ) ] 
(1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] + (1 − wp CD )(χ −
w [ κ − S + χ(T − κ) ] 
q. (43) also satisﬁes Eq. (94) . To verify that Eq. (43) is suﬃcient, w
 
zd = (1 − w ) [ S + (χ − 1) κ − χT ] 
1 − wp CD − (1 − w ) p 0 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
1 − p 0 
1 − p 0 
−p 0 
−p 0 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ , 
hich does not contain q . Using Eqs. (7) and (44) , we verify Eq.
elationship between the payoff of the two players, i.e., Eq. (16) . 
The strategies given by Eq. (43) are ZD strategies for w < 1 as
hat α  = 0 in Eq. (31) of Hilbe et al. (2015a ) because α = 0 corre
= φ(χ − 1) κ in Eq. (31) of Hilbe et al. (2015a ) without loss of g
nd (ii) either χ > 1 or χ < 0 is required (in the notation of Hil
eciprocal of our χ ). Then, we obtain 
 p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1 − φ(χ − 1)(R − κ) − (1 − w ) p 0 
1 + φ[ (χ − 1) κ − χT + S ] − (1 − w ) p 0 
φ[ (χ − 1) κ + T − χS ] − (1 − w ) p 0 
φ(χ − 1)(κ − P ) − (1 − w ) p 0 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
, 
hich is equivalent to Eq. (33) of Hilbe et al. (2015a ). Eq. (45) com
= 1 − wp CD − p 0 (1 − w ) 
κ − S + χ(T − κ) 
s equivalent to Eq. (43) . It should also be noted that Eq. (45) ex
 = 1 , to general w, R , and P values. 
The other type of solution that we obtain by substituting Eqs. (
p 0 [ T − R + χ(R − S)] = T − κ + χ(κ − S) . 
ubstitution of Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (94) yields either Eq. (43) 
p 0 [ P − S + χ(T − P )] = (χ − 1)(κ − P ) . 
he combination of Eqs. (47) and (48) is equivalent to that of 
= p 2 0 R + p 0 (1 − p 0 )(T + S) + (1 − p 0 ) 2 P 
nd 
= − (1 − p 0 )(T − P ) + p 0 (R − S) 
(1 − p 0 )(P − S) + p 0 (T − R ) 
. 
owever, Eqs. (41) , (42) , (49) , and (50) do not provide a suﬃcient 
dditionally consider the vector u zd when q = (1 , 0 , 0 , 0) and q = (
alculations shown in Appendix C lead to 
p 0 = p CC = p CD = p DC = p DD (0 ≤ p 0 ≤ 1) . 
To verify that the unconditional strategies given by Eq. (51) are
e substitute Eqs. (49) –(51) in Eq. (36) to obtain 
 
zd = (1 − w )(T − S) −(1 − p 0 ) P + S + p 0 (R − S − T ) 
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(52) 
7) . The unconditional strategy given by Eq. (51) is not a ZD strategy in 
 ), which is the same condition as that for the inﬁnitely repeated game 
and (50) , is equivalent to the previously derived solution for w = 1 
al cooperator and unconditional defector as special cases, and always 
ulations shown in Appendix E and Appendix F reveal the following 
 by Eq. (43) ( Appendix F.2 ), (ii) a subset of the strategies given by 
given by 
− R ) 
, 
wp CC (κ − P ) − w (R − P ) − (κ − R ) 
w (κ − R ) 
)
, p 0 = 1 , (53) 
 suﬃcient condition and the resulting solutions are distinct from those 
he union of the strategies given by the ZD strategies, Eq. (43) , and the 
 examine two special cases, which have been studied in the literature, 
nate share of payoffs larger than P ( Press and Dyson, 2012 ). We obtain 
 (43) , we obtain 
 − S − wp CD (χ − 1) P 
) P + T − χS ] 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (54) 
and p DD = 0 , which is consistent with the previously obtained result 
 cooperate and hence a so-called cautious strategy ( Hilbe et al., 2015a ). 
(55) 
(56) 
t hold true. We consider the case φ > 0 and χ > 1 in this section. We 
0 is not considered as an extortionate strategy ( Chen and Zinger, 2014; 
 Pan et al., 2015; Press and Dyson, 2012; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013; Xu 
ields 
(57) ×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
−(1 − p 0 )[ −(1 − p 0 ) P + (1 + p 0 ) R − p 0 (T + S)] 
−(1 − p 0 )[ −(2 − p 0 ) P + T + S + p 0 (R − S − T )] 
p 0 [ −(1 − p 0 ) P + (1 + p 0 ) R − p 0 (T + S)] 
p 0 [ −(2 − p 0 ) P + T + S + p 0 (R − S − T )] 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ , 
which does not contain q . Using Eqs. (7) and (52) , we verify Eq. (3
the sense of Hilbe et al. (2015a ) unless R + P = T + S ( Appendix D
( Hilbe et al., 2013b ). 
The obtained solution, i.e., Eq. (51) combined with Eqs. (49) 
( Hilbe et al., 2013b ). This set of solutions contains the uncondition
realizes χ < 0 ( Eq. (50) ). 
When κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 or T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 , the calc
three types of solutions: (i) a subset of the ZD strategies given
Eq. (51) ( Appendices E.1, E.2 and F.2 ), and (iii) the set of strategies 
p = 
(
p CC , 1 , 
wp CC (χ + 1)(κ − T ) − w [ R − (χ + 1) T + χκ] − (κ
w (κ − R ) 
where 0 ≤p CC ≤1 and κ  = R ( Appendix E.2 ). Although Eq. (53) is a
given by Eq. (43) , in fact Eq. (53) yields χ < 0 ( Appendix E.2 ). 
To summarize, the set of X ’s strategies that enforce Eq. (16) is t
non-ZD unconditional strategies, Eq. (51) . In the next sections, we
and derive w c in each case. 
3.3. Extortioner 
3.3.1. Expression 
The extortioner is deﬁned as a strategy that enforces an extortio
the extortioner by setting κ = P in Eq. (16) . By setting κ = P in Eq.
p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
(1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) R + S − χT ] − (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1) R + χT
w [ P − S + χ(T − P ) ] 
p CD 
− (1 − w ) p 0 (χ + 1)(T − S) + (1 − wp CD ) [ (χ − 1
w [ P − S + χ(T − P ) ] 
− (1 − w ) p 0 
w 
Because p DD = −(1 − w ) p 0 /w ≥ 0 and w < 1, we obtain p 0 = 0 
( Hilbe et al., 2015a ). Therefore, the extortioner is never the ﬁrst to
By setting p 0 = 0 in Eq. (54) , we obtain 
p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
− wp CD (χ − 1) P − (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1) R − S + χT 
w [ P − S + χ(T − P ) ] 
p CD 
(1 − wp CD ) [ (χ − 1) P + T − χS ] 
w [ P − S + χ(T − P ) ] 
0 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. 
3.3.2. Minimum discount rate 
By setting κ = P and p 0 = 0 in Eq. (45) , we obtain 
w p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1 − φ(χ − 1)(R − P ) 
1 + φ[ (χ − 1) P − χT + S ] 
φ[ (χ − 1) P + T − χS ] 
0 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. 
Because p CC ≤1 and w < 1, Eq. (56) implies that φ(χ − 1) > 0 mus
can exclude the case φ < 0 and χ < 1 because a strategy with χ < 
Hilbe et al., 2013a; 2013b; 2015a; McAvoy and Hauert, 2016; 2017;
et al., 2017 ) and χ < 1 implies χ < 0 ( Appendix G.1 ). 
When φ > 0, the application of 0 ≤p CC , p CD , p DC ≤1 to Eq. (56) y
(χ − 1) R −P 
P−S 
1 
≤ 1 
φ
≤ (χ − 1) 
R −P 
P−S 
1 − 1 , 
w w 
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(58) 
χ (59) 
T ) –(59) exists is given by 
(60) 
(61) 
χ (62) 
χ (63) 
E
χ (64) 
χ (65) 
χ (66) 
r
(66) , and the right-hand side of Eq. (65) is always smaller than that of 
E ght-hand sides of Eqs. (64) and (66) are positive. Therefore, w (T − P ) −
itive. On the other hand, if w (T − P ) − (T − R ) > 0 and w (T − S) − (P −
S  value exists. Therefore, an extortioner with χ > 1 exists if and only if 
w t is given by Eq. (32) . Under w > w c , Eqs. (64) and (66) imply 
χ
(67) 
E  strategy exists. The conditions for the existence of an extortionate 
s  w ) monotonically decreases as w increases. In particular, we obtain 
l
, and P = 0 in Eq. (32) yields 
w (68) 
w
3
3
ategy that yields a larger shortfall from the mutual cooperation payoff
R al., 2013b; Stewart and Plotkin, 2012; 2013 ). We obtain the generous 
s e obtain 
χS ] 
P ) 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (69) 
B 1 , which is consistent with the previously obtained result ( Hilbe et al., 
2 and hence a so-called nice strategy ( Axelrod, 1984; Hilbe et al., 2015a ). 1 + χ T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
≤ 1 
φ
≤ 1 + χ
T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , 
+ T − P 
P − S ≤
1 
φ
. 
he condition under which a positive φ value that satisﬁes Eqs. (57
(χ − 1) R −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
≤ 1 + χ
T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , 
1 + χ T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
≤ (χ − 1) 
R −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , 
+ T − P 
P − S ≤
(χ − 1) R −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , 
+ T − P 
P − S ≤
1 + χ T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 . 
q. (60) is always satisﬁed. Eqs. (61) –(63) yield 
[ w (T − P ) − (T − R ) ] ≥ R − S − w (P − S) , 
[ w (T − S) − (P − S) ] ≥ T − P − w (T − S) , 
[ w (R − S) − (P − S) ] ≥ T − P − w (T − R ) , 
espectively. 
The left-hand side of Eq. (65) is always larger than that of Eq. 
q. (66) . Therefore, Eq. (65) is satisﬁed if Eq. (66) is satisﬁed. The ri
(T − R ) > 0 and w (T − S) − (P − S) > 0 are required for χ to be pos
) > 0 , Eqs. (64) and (66) guarantee that χ > 1 and that a χ ( > 1)
 > w c , where the w c value coincides with that for the equalizer; i
≥ χc (w ) ≡ max 
(
R − S − w (P − S) 
w (T − P ) − (T − R ) , 
T − P − w (T − R ) 
w (R − S) − (P − S) 
)
. 
q. (67) gives the range of χ values for which the extortioner
trategy are easier to satisfy for large w in the sense that χ c (
im w → w c +0 χc (w ) = ∞ and lim w → 1 χc (w ) = 1 . 
For a given χ value, the substitution of R = b − c, T = b, S = −c
 c = χc + b 
χb + c , 
hich is consistent with Eq. (7) of McAvoy and Hauert (2016) . 
.4. Generous strategy 
.4.1. Expression 
The generous strategy, also called compliers, is deﬁned as a str
 for the player as compared to that for the co-player ( Hilbe et 
trategy by setting κ = R in Eq. (16) . By setting κ = R in Eq. (43) , w
p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1 − p 0 (1 − w ) 
w 
p CD 
− (1 − w ) p 0 (χ + 1)(T − S) + (1 − wp CD ) [ (χ − 1) R + T −
w [ R − S + χ(T − R ) ] 
(1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] + (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1)(R −
w [ R − S + χ(T − R ) ] 
ecause p CC = [1 − (1 − w ) p 0 ] /w ≤ 1 , we obtain p 0 = 1 and p CC = 
015a ). Therefore, the generous strategy is never the ﬁrst to detect 
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Fig. 2. Region in the g 1 –g 2 space where the generous strategy exists (shaded region). If ( g 1 , g 2 ) is located in this region (e.g., ﬁlled circle labeled p CD = 0 ), the square given 
by 1 /w − 1 ≤ g 1 , g 2 ≤ 1 /w intersects the line segment connecting the assumed ( g 1 , g 2 ) and the origin. Note that any point on the line segment is realized by the solution by 
a value of p CD ( Eqs. (71) and (72) ). 
 ] 
 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
Eqs. (71) and (72) to exist is given by ( Fig. 2 ) 
(75) By setting p 0 = 1 in Eq. (69) , we obtain 
p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1 
p CD 
− (1 − w )(χ + 1)(T − S) + (1 − wp CD ) [ (χ − 1) R + T − χS
w [ R − S + χ(T − R ) ] 
(1 − w ) [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] + (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1)(R − P )
w [ R − S + χ(T − R ) ] 
= 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1 
p CD 
1 − 1 
w 
+ (1 − p CD ) [ (χ − 1) R + T − χS ] 
R − S + χ(T − R ) 
1 − 1 
w 
+ (1 − p CD )(χ − 1)(R − P ) 
R − S + χ(T − R ) 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. 
3.4.2. Minimum discount rate 
By applying 0 ≤p DC , p DD ≤1 to Eq. (70) , we obtain 
1 
w 
− 1 ≤ (1 − p CD ) g 1 ≤ 1 
w 
, 
1 
w 
− 1 ≤ (1 − p CD ) g 2 ≤ 1 
w 
, 
where 
g 1 ≡ (χ − 1) R + T − χS 
R − S + χ(T − R ) , 
g 2 ≡ (χ − 1)(R − P ) 
R − S + χ(T − R ) . 
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for 0 ≤p CD ≤1 that satisﬁes 
g 1 ≥ 1 − 1 , 
w 
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g (76) 
1 (77) 
enerous strategy requires ( Chen and Zinger, 2014; Hilbe et al., 2013b; 
2 , and examine the conditions given by Eqs. (75) –(77) . For mathematical 
i presented in Appendix G.2 . First, because d g 1 /d χ > 0, which one can 
d ivalent to 
χ (78) 
a
w (79) 
W ) does not exist. Second, because d g 2 /d χ > 0 and g 2 is continuous for 
χ
χ (80) 
a
w (81) 
W ) does not exist. Third, because d( g 2 / g 1 )/d χ > 0 and g 2 / g 1 is continuous 
f
χ (82) 
a
w (83) 
W  does not exist. 
s strategy exists if and only if w > w c , where w c is given by Eq. (32) . 
T sts is the same for the equalizer, extortioner, and generous strategy. 
I t not for the extortioner and the generous strategy. When w > w c , 
E
χ . (84) 
N . (84) implies that lim w → w c +0 χc (w ) = ∞ and lim w → 1 χc (w ) = 1 , which 
a
4
ma games with general payoff matrices. Apart from the derivation of 
c in the present article are two-fold. First, we derived the threshold dis- 
c e commonly studied classes of ZD strategies, i.e., equalizer, extortioner, 
a  Similar to the case of the condition for mutual cooperation in direct 
r ly many rounds. Second, we showed that the memory-one strategies 
t layers are either ZD strategies ( Eqs. (43) and (53) ) or an unconditional 
s ooperator and unconditional defector as special cases. Therefore, for 
ﬁ red aﬃrmatively to the conjecture posed in Hilbe et al. (2013b ). With 
a he consideration of the limit w → 1. In other words, if the two payoffs 
a e payoffs are also on a line as 	 goes to 0. For a similar argument, see 
E d true when the co-player employs a longer-memory strategy, because 
i nd Dyson, 2012 ) to the ﬁnite case. 
s. Press and Dyson’s derivation is based on the linear algebra of matri- 
c iders certain telescoping sums. The approach considered in the present 
s itions and show that they are suﬃcient by straightforward calculations. 
njecture that the w c value is the same for all ZD strategies because it 
t  the explicit forms of our solutions ( Eqs. (25) and (43) ) may be useful 
f For example, investigation of evolutionary dynamics and extensions to 
m ed games (see Section 1 for references), in the case of ﬁnitely repeated 
g 2 ≥ 1 
w 
− 1 , 
 − w ≤ g 2 
g 1 
≤ 1 
1 − w . 
In the remainder of this section, we assume χ ≥0, which a g
015a; McAvoy and Hauert, 2016; 2017; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013 )
nterests, the analysis of the minimum discount rate for χ < 0 is 
erive using Eq. (3) , and g 1 is continuous for χ ≥0, Eq. (75) is equ
≥ R − S − w (T − S) −(T − R ) + w (T − S) 
nd 
 > 
T − R 
T − S . 
hen w ≤ (T − R ) / (T − S) , a positive χ value that satisﬁes Eq. (75
≥0, Eq. (76) is equivalent to 
≥ R − S − w (P − S) −(T − R ) + w (T − P ) 
nd 
 > 
T − R 
T − P . 
hen w ≤ (T − R ) / (T − P ) , a positive χ value that satisﬁes Eq. (76
or χ ≥0, Eq. (77) is equivalent to 
≥ T − P − w (T − R ) −(P − S) + w (R − S) 
nd 
 > 
P − S 
R − S . 
hen w ≤ (P − S) / (R − S) , a positive χ value that satisﬁes Eq. (77)
By combining Eqs. (79) , (81) , and (83) , we ﬁnd that a generou
herefore, the threshold w value above which a ZD strategy exi
t should be noted that w = w c is allowed for the equalizer, bu
q. (80) implies Eq. (78) , and hence one obtains 
≥ χc (w ) ≡ max 
(
R − S − w (P − S) 
−(T − R ) + w (T − P ) , 
T − P − w (T − R ) 
−(P − S) + w (R − S) 
)
ote that χ c ( w ) > 1 and χ c ( w ) decreases as w ( > w c ) increases. Eq
re the same asymptotic as the case of the extortioner. 
. Conclusions 
We analyzed ZD strategies in ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilem
onvenient expressions for ZD strategies, the novel results derived 
ount factor value, w c , above which the ZD strategies exist for thre
nd generous strategies. They all share the same threshold value.
eciprocity, ZD strategies can exist only when there are suﬃcient
hat impose a linear relationship between the payoff of the two p
trategy ( Eq. (51) ). The latter class includes the unconditional c
nitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games (i.e., w < 1), we answe
 continuity argument, our results also cover the inﬁnite case, by t
re in a linear relationship for any w = 1 − 	, where 	 
1, then th
qs. (5) and (6) in Hilbe et al. (2015a ). The present results also hol
t is straightforward to apply the proof for the inﬁnite case ( Press a
Our analytical approach is different from the previous approache
es ( Press and Dyson, 2012 ). The proof in Hilbe et al. (2013a ) cons
tudy is more elementary than theirs, i.e., to derive necessary cond
We mention possible directions of future research. First, we co
akes the same value for the three common ZD strategies. Second,
or exploring features of ZD strategies in ﬁnitely repeated games. 
ultiplayer games, which have been examined for inﬁnitely repeat
ames may beneﬁt from the present results. 
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the obtained M in Eq. (18) , we obtain 
wp CD ) P + w (p CC − wp CC + wp DD ) T 
 wp DD ) T 
 wp DC ) P + w (p DC − wp DC + wp DD ) T 
 DD T 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ , (85) 
(86) 
tuting the obtained M in Eq. (18) , we obtain 
 wp DC ) R 
 wp CD ) S + w (p CD − wp CD + wp DC ) R 
C R 
 wp DD ) S + w (p DD + wp DC − wp DD ) R 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ , (87) 
(88) 
ry conditions in Section 3.2 
the obtained M in Eq. (36) , we obtain 
p CC + wp DD )(S − χT ) + (χ − 1) κ − (1 − w )(χ − 1) R 
 + wp DD )(S − χT ) 
 DD 
+ (χ − 1) κ
p DC + wp DD )(S − χT ) + (χ − 1) κ + (1 − w )(T − χS) 
wp DD (S − χT ) 
 DD 
+ (χ − 1) κ
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (89) 
 obtained M in Eq. (36) , we obtain 
 wp DC )(χ − 1) R 
C 
+ (χ − 1) κ
 
+ wp DC )(χ − 1) R + (χ − 1) κ + (1 − w )(S − χT ) 
 DC (χ − 1) R 
C 
+ (χ − 1) κ
 
− wp DD )(χ − 1) R + (χ − 1) κ − (1 − w )(χ − 1) P 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (90) 
 (90) is positive. 
 DC ) [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] } 
p DC − wp CD + wp DC )(χ − 1) P 
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Appendix A. Expression of u eq,0 0 0 0 , πY ,0 0 0 0 , u 
eq,1111 , and πY ,1111 
By substituting q = (0 , 0 , 0 , 0) in Eq. (10) and then substituting 
u eq , 0 0 0 0 = 1 
(1 − w )(1 − wp CD + wp DD ) 
×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
(1 − w )(1 − wp CD + wp DD ) R + w (1 − p CC + wp CC −
w (1 − p CD ) P + (1 − w +
(1 − w )(1 − wp CD + wp DD ) S + w (1 − p DC − wp CD +
(1 − wp CD ) P + wp
which leads to 
πY, 0 0 0 0 = (1 − w ) v (0) u eq , 0 0 0 0 . 
Similarly, by substituting q = (1 , 1 , 1 , 1) in Eq. (10) and then substi
u eq , 1111 = 1 
(1 − w )(1 − wp CC + wp DC ) 
×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
w (1 − p CC ) S + (1 − w +
(1 − w )(1 − wp CC + wp DC ) T + w (1 − p CD − wp CC +
(1 − wp CC ) S + wp D
(1 − w )(1 − wp CC + wp DC ) P + w (1 − p DD − wp CC +
which leads to 
πY, 1111 = (1 − w ) v (0) u eq , 1111 . 
Appendix B. Expression of u zd,0 0 0 0 and u zd,1111 , and four necessa
By substituting q = (0 , 0 , 0 , 0) in Eq. (10) and then substituting 
u zd , 0 0 0 0 = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
− w (1 − p CC + wp CC − wp CD )(χ − 1) P + w (p CC − w
1 − wp CD + wp DD 
− w (1 − p CD )(χ − 1) P + (1 − w
1 − wp CD + wp
− w (1 − p DC − wp CD + wp DC )(χ − 1) P + w (p DC − w
1 − wp CD + wp DD 
− (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1) P + 
1 − wp CD + wp
By substituting q = (1 , 1 , 1 , 1) in Eq. (10) and then substituting the
u zd , 1111 = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
w (1 − p CC )(T − χS) − (1 − w +
1 − wp CC + wp D
w (1 − p CD − wp CC + wp CD )(T − χS) − w (p CD − wp CD
1 − wp CC + wp DC 
(1 − wp CC )(T − χS) − wp
1 − wp CC + wp D
w (1 − p DD − wp CC + wp DD )(T − χS) − w (p DD + wp DC
1 − wp CC + wp DC 
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eqs. (89) and
By substituting Eq. (89) in Eq. (39) , we obtain 
(1 − w ) p 0 { (1 − wp CD + wp DD ) [ −(χ − 1) R − T + χS ] + w (p CC − p
+ (1 − wp CD + wp DD ) [ (χ − 1) κ + (1 − w )(T − χS) ] + w [ −(1 −
+ (p DC − wp DC + wp DD )(S − χT )] = 0 . 
By substituting Eq. (89) in Eq. (40) , we obtain 
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χT ) + (1 − wp CD + wp DD )(χ − 1) κ = 0 . (92) 
B
− 1) κ = 0 . (93) 
B
 
) [ −(χ − 1) R − T + χS ] } 
 CC + wp DD )(T − χS) 
(94) 
A
u
 
wp CD + wp DD ) 
 − p CC )[1 − (1 − w ) p DC − wp CD ] P 
}
(χ − 1) 
) + w [(1 − w ) p DC + wp DD ](S − χT ) } } + (χ − 1) κ
 + wp DD )(S − χT ) 
 DD 
+ (χ − 1) κ
p DC + wp DD )(S − χT ) + (χ − 1) κ + (1 − w )(T − χS) 
p DD (S − χT ) 
 DD 
+ (χ − 1) κ
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (95) 
N  positive. By substituting Eq. (95) in Eq. (40) , we obtain Eq. (92) . By 
s
} (χ − 1) 
](S − χT ) } 
 ) p DC + wp DD ](S − χT ) } 
 CD + wp DD )(1 − w )(T − χS) = 0 . (96) 
S  entry of Eq. (43) or 
(97) 
T (97) is equal to 0 is covered in Appendix E and Appendix F . We note 
t h contradicts Eq. (2) . By combining this observation with 0 < w < 1, we 
o
(98) 
B ing four possible cases: p 0 = p DC , p 0 = 1 , p 0 = (R − P ) / (T + S − R − P ) , 
a
(47) in Eq. (93) , we obtain (p CC − p DC ) [ T − κ + χ(κ − S) ] = 0 . Because 
w ith in Appendix E , we obtain p CC = p DC . Therefore, we obtain 
(99) 
ields κ = R . Substitution of p 0 = 1 and κ = R in Eq. (42) yields p CC = 1 . 
S stitution of p 0 = 1 , χ = −(R − S) / (T − R ) , and κ = R in Eq. (92) yields 
 1 combined with Eqs. (49) and (50) results in 
(100) 
(101) 
b 1 leads to T + S − R − P > 0 and 2 R ≤ T + S, and the latter inequality 
c
uting p 0 = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) in Eqs. (49) and (50) , we obtain 
χ S + χ(T − κ) = 0 , which we have decided to deal with later. (1 − w ) p 0 [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] − (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1) P + wp DD (S −
y substituting Eq. (90) in Eq. (39) , we obtain 
(1 − w ) p 0 [ −(χ − 1) R − T + χS ] 
+ (1 − wp CC )(T − χS) − wp DC (χ − 1) R + (1 − wp CC + wp DC )(χ
y substituting Eq. (90) in Eq. (40) , we obtain 
(1 − w ) p 0 { (1 − wp CC + wp DC ) [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] + w (p CD − p DD
+ (1 − wp CC + wp DC )(χ − 1) [ κ − (1 − w ) P ] + w [(1 − p DD − wp
− (p DD + wp DC − wp DD )(χ − 1) R ] = 0 . 
ppendix C. Derivation of Eq. (51) 
In this section, we derive Eq. (51) from Eqs. (49) to (50) . 
We obtain 
 
zd , 10 0 0 = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1
(1 − wp CC )(1 −
×
{{
−(1 − w )(1 − wp CD + wp DD ) R − w 2 (1
+ w (1 − p CC ) { (1 − w )(1 − wp CD + wp DD )(T − χS
− w (1 − p CD )(χ − 1) P + (1 − w
1 − wp CD + wp
− w (1 − p DC − wp CD + wp DC )(χ − 1) P + w (p DC − w
1 − wp CD + wp DD 
− (1 − wp CD )(χ − 1) P + w
1 − wp CD + wp
ote that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (95) is
ubstituting Eq. (95) in Eq. (39) , we obtain 
p 0 (1 − w ) { { −(1 − wp CD + wp DD ) R + w [1 − (1 − w ) p DC − wp CD ] P 
−( 1 − w )(1 − wp CD + wp DD )(T − χS) − w [(1 − w ) p DC + wp DD 
+(1 − wp CC ) { −w [1 − (1 − w ) p DC − wp CD ](χ − 1) P + w [(1 − w
+(1 − wp CC )(1 − wp CD + wp DD )(χ − 1) κ + (1 − wp CC )(1 − wp
ubstitution of Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (96) yields either the third
(p 0 − p DC )(κ − R )(1 − w ) w (χ − 1) [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] 
[ T − κ + χ(κ − S) ] [ κ − S + χ(T − κ) ] = 0 . 
he case in which the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. 
hat χ  = 1 because χ = 1 substituted in Eq. (50) yields T = S, whic
btain 
(p 0 − p DC )(κ − R ) [ (χ − 1) P + S − χT ] = 0 . 
y substituting Eqs. (49) and (50) in Eq. (98) , we obtain the follow
nd p 0 = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) . 
First, assume that p 0 = p DC . By substituting p 0 = p DC and Eq. 
e have excluded the case T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 , which we deal w
p 0 = p CC = p DC . 
Second, assume that p 0 = 1 . Substitution of p 0 = 1 in Eq. (49) y
ubstitution of p 0 = 1 in Eq. (50) yields χ = −(R − S) / (T − R ) . Sub
(1 − p CD )(T − S)(R − P ) = 0 , which implies p CD = 1 . Therefore, p 0 =
p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1 . 
Third, we note that 
p 0  = R − P 
T + S − R − P 
ecause combination of p 0 = (R − P ) / (T + S − R − P ) and 0 ≤p 0 ≤
ontradicts Eq. (3) . 
Fourth, assume that p 0 = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) . By substit
= −(P − S) / (T − P ) and κ = P, respectively. Then, we obtain κ −
To summarize, Eq. (98) leads to either Eq. (99) or (100) . 
We obtain 
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) + p CC p DD ) ] 
p DC ) ( 1 − p DD ) 
]
R 
 − p DD ) [ ( 1 − wp CD ) − ( 1 − w ) p CC ] ( T − χS ) 
− χS ) ] 
 
 
)}
( T − χS ) + w 
[
p DC + w 2 ( p CC − p DC ) p DD 
]
( S − χT ) 
 { ( 1 − p DD ) ( 1 − wp CD ) ( T − χS ) 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. 
(102) 
ositive. By substituting Eq. (102) in Eq. (40) , we obtain 
(S − χT ) } − [(1 − wp CD ) P 
) + w [ p DC + p DD (p CC − p DC )](S − χT ) } 
= 0 . (103) 
d entry of Eq. (43) or 
− w ) p 0 − wp CD ](χ − 1)[ T − R + χ(R − S)] P 
− wp CD )(χ − 1) R 
 
= 0 . (104) 
d side of Eq. (104) is zero in Appendix E and Appendix F . Therefore, 
n Eq. (104) to obtain p 0 = p CD , p 0 = 0 , p 0 = (R − P ) / (T + S − R − P ) , 
ble options, we have excluded p 0 = (R − P ) / (T + S − R − P ) and 
 
zd,10 0 0 . 
48) in Eq. (92) , we obtain (p CD − p DD ) [ κ − S + χ(T − κ) ] = 0 . Because 
ith in Appendix E , we obtain p DD = p CD . Therefore, we obtain 
(105) 
ields κ = P . Substitution of p 0 = 0 and κ = P in Eq. (41) yields p DD = 0 . 
stitution of p 0 = 0 , χ = −(T − P ) / (P − S) , and κ = P in Eq. (93) yields 
ed with Eqs. (49) and (50) results in 
(106) 
0) , and either Eq. (105) or (106) . The combination of Eqs. (99) and 
 combination of Eqs. (99) and (106) provides a subset of the strategies 
provides a subset of the strategies given by Eq. (51) . Eqs. (100) and 
ns is given by Eq. (51) . 
ss R + P = T + S
by Eq. (51) is not a ZD strategy in the sense of Hilbe et al. (2015a ) if 
 p 0 
, (107) 
to obtain p DD = −(1 − w ) p 0 /w . This equation holds true if and only if 
n Eq. (45) to obtain p CC = [ 1 − (1 − w ) p 0 ] /w . This equation holds true 
 obtain φ  = 0. Given φ  = 0, Eq. (107) implies 
(108) u zd , 0 0 01 = ( χ − 1 ) κ
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ + 1 
( 1 + w ) ( 1 − wp CD ) + w 2 [ p DC ( 1 − p DD
×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
{[
−1 + wp CD + w 2 ( 1 − p DC ) ( 1 − p DD ) − w 3 ( p CD −
+ w [ −1 + ( 1 − w ) p CC + wp CD ] P } ( χ − 1 ) + w { w ( 1
+ 
[
p CC − w 2 ( 1 − p DD ) ( p CC − p DC ) 
]
( S − χT ) 
}
w ( 1 − p CD ) [ −( P + wp DD R ) ( χ − 1 ) + w ( 1 − p DD ) ( T 
+ 
[
1 − w 2 ( 1 − p DC − p CC p DD + p DC p DD ) 
]
( S − χT )
w [ −1 + wp CD + ( 1 − w ) p DC ] ( P + wp DD R ) ( χ − 1 ) 
+ 
{
1 − w 2 p DD [ 1 − ( 1 − w ) p CC ] − wp CD 
(
1 − w 2 p DD
−[ ( 1 − wp CD ) P + wp DD ( 1 − wp CD ) R ] ( χ − 1 ) + w
+ w ( p DC + p CC p DD − p DC p DD ) ( S − χT ) } 
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (102) is p
(1 − w ) p 0 { (P + wp DD R )(χ − 1) − w (1 − p DD )(T − χS) + (1 + w )
+ wp DD (1 − wp CD ) R ](χ − 1) + w { (1 − p DD )(1 − wp CD )(T − χS
+ 
{
1 + w (1 − p CD ) − w 2 [ p CD − p DC − p DD (p CC − p DC )] 
}
(χ − 1) κ
Substitution of Eqs. (41) and (42) in Eq. (103) yields either the thir
1 
[ T − κ + χ(κ − S)][ κ − S + χ(T − κ)] ×
{
w (χ − 1) 2 κ2 − [1 − (1 
+ { w (T − χS) + (1 − w ) p 0 [ T − R + χ(R − S)] } (S − χT ) − { −(1 
−[1 + w (1 − p CD − χ)] T + [ χ − w (1 − χ + p CD χ)] S } (χ − 1) κ}
We examine the case in which the denominator on the right-han
we ignore the denominator and substitute Eqs. (49) and (50) i
or p 0 = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) . Among these four possi
p 0 = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) in the course of the analysis of u
First, assume that p 0 = p CD . By substituting p 0 = p CD and Eq. (
we have excluded the case κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 , which we deal w
p 0 = p CD = p DD . 
Second, assume that p 0 = 0 . Substitution of p 0 = 0 in Eq. (49) y
Substitution of p 0 = 0 in Eq. (50) yields χ = −(T − P ) / (P − S) . Sub
wp DC (R − P ) = 0 , which implies p DC = 0 . Therefore, p 0 = 0 combin
p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 . 
A solution must simultaneously satisfy either Eq. (99) or (10
(105) provides the set of unconditional strategies, i.e., Eq. (51) . The
given by Eq. (51) . The combination of Eqs. (100) and (105) also 
(106) are inconsistent with each other. Therefore, the set of solutio
Appendix D. An unconditional strategy is not a ZD strategy unle
In this section, we show that the unconditional strategy given 
R + P  = T + S. 
By substituting p DC = p DD in Eq. (45) , we obtain 
φ[ (χ − 1) κ + T − χS ] − (1 − w ) p 0 
w 
= φ(χ − 1)(κ − P ) − (1 − w )
w 
which leads to 
φ[(χ − 1) κ + T − χS] = φ(χ − 1)(κ − P ) . 
If φ = 0 , we substitute φ = 0 in the expression of p DD in Eq. (45) 
p 0 = p DD = 0 . Next, we substitute φ = 0 in the expression of p CC i
if and only if p 0 = p CC = 1 , which contradicts p 0 = 0 . Therefore, we
χ = −T − P 
P − S . 
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B
χ (109) 
B
R (110) 
to be a ZD because substitution of Eqs. (49) , (50) , (110) and 
φ (111) 
i
A
κ (112) 
a
(113) 
E . (112) yields T = S, which contradicts Eq. (2) . Substitution of κ = P in 
E w ) p 0 − 1 + wp CD = 0 , we obtain p 0 = p CD = 1 . Therefore, we consider 
t
κ (114) 
a
χ (115) 
a
κ (116) 
a
(117) 
E
S) = 0 . (118) 
B
 
(0 ≤p CD , p DD ≤1) that satisﬁes p CD − p DD = 1 /w, we obtain 
(119) 
I h contradicts Eq. (119) . Therefore, Eq. (119) leads to T + S − R − P  = 0 , 
a
(120) 
I  R ≤ P , which contradicts Eq. (2) . Therefore, we obtain T + S − R − P < 0 
a
T + S) − [ 2 − (1 − 2 w ) p 0 − 2 wp CC ] P } (T − S) = 0 . (121) 
B
2 wp CC ] P = 0 . (122) 
S
(123) 
W refore, by assuming T + S − 2 P < 0 , we obtain 
(124) 
2 wp CC + wp DC ] P + T + S } (T − S) = 0 . (125) y setting p CC = p CD in Eq. (45) and using φ  = 0, we obtain 
= − R − S 
T − R . 
y combining Eqs. (108) and (109) , we obtain 
 + P = T + S. 
Eq. (110) is a suﬃcient condition for the unconditional strategy 
= − T − R 
(T − S)(R − P ) 
n Eq. (45) yields Eq. (51) . 
ppendix E. Case κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 
In this section, we assume 
− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 
nd derive the set of strategies that satisfy Eq. (16) . 
By substituting Eq. (112) in Eq. (92) , we obtain 
(χ − 1)(κ − P ) [ (1 − w ) p 0 − 1 + wp CD ] = 0 . 
q. (112) does not allow χ = 1 because substitution of χ = 1 in Eq
q. (112) yields χ = −(P − S) / (T − P ) . Alternatively, if we set (1 −
he following two subcases, i.e., subcase (A) speciﬁed by 
= P 
nd 
= − P − S 
T − P , 
nd subcase (B) speciﬁed by 
− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 
nd 
p 0 = p CD = 1 . 
1. Subcase (A): κ = P and χ = −(P − S) / (T − P ) 
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (91) , we obtain 
(1 − w )[1 − w (p CD − p DD )][ −p 0 (T + S − R − P ) + T + S − 2 P ](T −
T − P 
ecause T > P > S , 0 < w < 1, and there exists no pair of p CD and p DD
p 0 (T + S − R − P ) = T + S − 2 P. 
f we set T + S − R − P = 0 , we obtain T + S − 2 P = R − P > 0 , whic
nd hence 
p 0 = T + S − 2 P 
T + S − R − P . 
f T + S − R − P > 0 , the condition p 0 ≤1 applied to Eq. (120) yields
nd hence T + S − 2 P ≤ 0 . 
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (96) , we obtain 
(1 − w ) [ 1 − w (p CD − p DD ) ] { p 0 [ R − (1 − w )(T + S) ] + (1 − wp CC )(
T − P 
ecause 1 − w (p CD − p DD ) > 0 , Eq. (121) implies 
p 0 [ R − (1 − w )(T + S) ] + (1 − wp CC )(T + S) − [ 2 − (1 − 2 w ) p 0 −
ubstitution of Eq. (120) in Eq. (122) yields 
w [ −p CC (T + S − R − P ) + T + S − 2 P ] (T + S − 2 P ) 
T + S − R − P = 0 . 
e will deal with the case T + S − 2 P = 0 later in this section. The
p CC = 
T + S − 2 P 
T + S − R − P . 
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (93) , we obtain 
{ (1 − w ) p 0 (R − S − T ) + wp DC R − wp CC (T + S) − [ 2 − (1 − w ) p 0 −
T − P 
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 , we obtain 
(126) 
(127) 
S) = 0 . (128) 
dicts Eq. (120) . Therefore, Eq. (128) implies 
(129) 
 adopts the tit-for-tat strategy, i.e., q = (1 , 0 , 1 , 0) . This vector, denoted 
1 
1 − w ) + w (1 + w ) p DD (1 − wp CC ) + w 3 p CD p DD 
 
)(p DC − p DD )] R 
1 − w (1 − p DD )](T − χS) 
 − w (1 − p DD )] R 
}
(χ − 1) 
χS) + (1 − wp CC )[1 − w (1 − p DD )](S − χT ) 
p DD ] R } (χ − 1) 
w ) p DC + wp DD ](1 − wp CC )(S − χT ) 
 } P − w 2 p CD p DD R 
}
(χ − 1) 
D (1 − wp CC )(S − χT ) 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ 
. (130) 
ositive. By substituting Eq. (130) in Eq. (40) , we obtain 
1) + w [1 − (1 − w ) p CD − wp CC ](T − χS) 
C (1 − w 2 p DC ) } P − w 2 p CD p DD R 
}
(χ − 1) 
 − χT ) 
p CC [1 − w 2 p DC + (1 + w ) wp DD ] } (χ − 1) κ = 0 . (131) 
tain 
 S) − [2 − p CD − 2 w (p CC − p CD )] P } (T − S) = 0 . (132) 
. (132) , we obtain 
P ] (T + S − 2 P ) = 0 . (133) 
 /p 0 , i.e., w = p 0 = 1 , which contradicts 0 < w < 1. Because we decided 
(134) 
 (T + S − R − P ) if T + S − 2 P < 0 . Substitution of p 0 in Eqs. (49) and 
iding with the condition for subcase (A). Therefore, the strategy 
T + S − 2 P < 0 , is a special case of Eq. (51) . 
g this condition with Eq. (120) , we obtain p 0 = 0 . By substituting 
 , which implies that p DC = 0 . By substituting T + S − 2 P = 0 and p 0 = 0 
hat p DD = 0 . Because p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 , the focal player X never uses 
 substituting p 0 = 0 in Eqs. (49) and (50) and using T + S − 2 P = 0 , we 
spectively, coinciding with the condition for subcase (A). Therefore, the By substituting p 0 = p CC = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) in Eq. (125)
w [ −p DC (T + S − R − P ) + T + S − 2 P ] (P − R )(T − S) 
(T − P )(T + S − R − P ) = 0 , 
which leads to 
p DC = 
T + S − 2 P 
T + S − R − P . 
By substituting Eqs. (114) and (115) in Eq. (103) , we obtain 
w [ 1 − wp CD − (1 − w ) p 0 ] [ −p DD (T + S − R − P ) + T + S − 2 P ] (T −
T − P 
If 1 − wp CD − (1 − w ) p 0 = 0 , we obtain p 0 = p CD = 1 , which contra
p DD = 
T + S − 2 P 
T + S − R − P . 
To derive another condition, we use the vector u when player Y
by u zd,1010 , is given by 
u zd , 1010 = (χ − 1) κ
⎛ 
⎜ ⎝ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎠ + 
(1 − wp CC )(1 − w 2 p DC ) + w 2 p CD p DC (
×
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
{
−[1 − w (1 − p DD ) − w 2 p DC (1 − p CD ) + w 3 (1 − p CD
−w 2 (1 − p CC )(1 − p DC ) P } (χ − 1) + w (1 − p CC )[
+ w 2 (1 − p CC )[ p DC − w (p DC − p DD )](S − χT ) {
−w 2 (1 − p DC )[1 − (1 − w ) p CD − wp CC ] P − wp CD [1
+ w [1 − (1 − w ) p CD − wp CC ][1 − w (1 − p DD )](T −
w { −(1 − p DC )(1 − wp CC ) P − wp CD [(1 − w ) p DC + w
+(1 − wp CC )[1 − w (1 − p DD )](T − χS) + w [(1 −{
−{ 1 − w 2 p DC [1 − p CD (1 − w )] − wp CC (1 − w 2 p DC )
+ w 2 p DD [1 − p CD (1 − w ) − wp CC ](T − χS) + wp D
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (130) is p
(1 − w ) p 0 
{{
−wp CD R + [1 + w (1 − p CC ) − w 2 (p CC − p CD )] P 
}
(χ −
+( 1 − wp CC )(S − χT ) } + 
{{−1 + w 2 p DC [1 − (1 − w ) p CD ] + wp C
+ w 2 p DD [1 − (1 − w ) p CD − wp CC ](T − χS) + wp DD (1 − wp CC )(S
+ { 1 − w 2 p DC + (1 − w ) w 2 p CD p DC + wp DD (1 + w + w 2 p CD ) − w
By substituting κ = P and χ = −(P − S) / (T − P ) in Eq. (131) , we ob
w [(1 − w ) p 0 + wp DD ] { p CD [ R − (1 − w )(T + S)] + (1 − wp CC )(T +
T − P 
By substituting p 0 = p CC = p DD = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) in Eq
[ −p CD (T + S − R − P ) + T + S − 2 P ] [ −w (T + S − 2 P ) + T + S − R −
(T + S − R − P ) 2 
If −w (T + S − 2 P ) + T + S − R − P = 0 , Eq. (120) implies that w = 1
to treat the case T + S − 2 P = 0 later, Eq. (133) , implies 
p CD = T + S − 2 P 
T + S − R − P . 
In sum, we obtain p 0 = p CC = p CD = p DC = p DD = (T + S − 2 P ) /
(50) yields χ = −(P − S) / (T − P ) and κ = P, respectively, coinc
p 0 = p CC = p CD = p DC = p DD = (T + S − 2 P ) / (T + S − R − P ) , where 
Finally, let us consider the case T + S − 2 P = 0 . By combinin
T + S − 2 P = 0 and p 0 = 0 in Eq. (125) , we obtain w (R − P ) p DC = 0
in Eq. (128) , we obtain (1 − wp CD )(R − P ) p DD = 0 , which implies t
p CC and p CD . Therefore, p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 speciﬁes a strategy. By
obtain χ = −(T − P ) / (P − S) = −(P − S) / (T − P ) = −1 and κ = P, re
strategy p = p = p = 0 is a special case of Eq. (51) . 0 DC DD 
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T2. Subcase (B): κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 and p 0 = p CD = 1 
By substituting Eqs. (116) and (117) in Eq. (91) , we obtain 
(1 − w )(χ − 1) [ wp DD (κ − R ) − wp CC (κ − P ) + w (R − P ) + κ − R ]
= 0 . (135) 
ote that 0 < w < 1. Because χ = 1 is inconsistent with
− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 , Eq. (135) yields 
p DD = 
wp CC (κ − P ) − w (R − P ) − (κ − R ) 
w (κ − R ) (136) 
rovided that κ  = R . We will deal with the case κ = R later in this
ection. By substituting Eqs. (116) and (117) in Eq. (93) , we obtain 
(χ − 1) { wp DC (κ − R ) − wp CC (χ + 1)(κ − T ) 
+ w [ R − (χ + 1) T + χκ] + κ − R } = 0 , (137) 
hich yields 
p DC = 
wp CC (χ + 1)(κ − T ) − w [ R − (χ + 1) T + χκ] − (κ − R ) 
w (κ − R ) 
(138) 
rovided that κ  = R . Therefore, we obtain 
p = 
(
p CC , 1 , 
wp CC (χ + 1)(κ − T ) − w [ R − (χ + 1) T + χκ] − (κ − R ) 
w (κ − R ) , 
wp CC (κ − P ) − w (R − P ) − (κ − R ) 
w (κ − R ) 
)
, p 0 = 1 , (139) 
.e., Eq. (53) , as a necessary condition for the linear relationship
etween the payoff of the two players, i.e., Eq. (16) . 
To verify that Eq. (53) is suﬃcient, we substitute Eq. (53) (i.e.,
q. (139) ) in Eq. (36) to obtain 
 
zd = 
(
0 , 0 , − (1 − w )(χ − 1)(κ − R ) 
w (1 − p CC ) 
, 
− (1 − w )(χ − 1)(κ − R ) 
w (1 − p CC ) 
)
, (140) 
hich is independent of q . By combining Eqs. (7) , (140) , and
p 0 = 1 , we obtain v (0) u zd = 0 , i.e., Eq. (37) . Therefore, Eq. (53) is
 solution that satisﬁes Eq. (16) . 
The strategy given by Eq. (53) is expressed in the form of
q. (45) if we set φ = −w (1 − p CC ) / [ (κ − R )(χ − 1) ] (and use
− S + χ(T − κ) = 0 and p 0 = 1 ). As an example, we consider
he repeated PD game deﬁned by R = 3 , T = 5 , S = −2 , P = 1 ,
nd w = 0 . 8 . We set κ = 2 . Because this solution requires κ − S +
(T − κ) = 0 ( Eq. (116) ), we obtain χ = −4 / 3 . If we set p CC = 0 ,
e obtain p = ( 0 , 1 , 3 / 4 , 3 / 4 ) and p 0 = 1 . This solution cannot
e represented in the form of Eq. (43) because Eq. (43) requires
− S + χ(T − κ)  = 0 . Consistent with this example, Eq. (45) com-
ined with φ = −w (1 − p CC ) / [ (κ − R )(χ − 1) ] , κ − S + χ(T − κ) =
 , and p 0 = 1 yields χ < 0. This can be shown as follows. By sub-
tituting κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 and p 0 = 1 in Eq. (45) , we obtain 
p = 
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
1 − φ(χ−1)(R −κ) 
w 
1 
1 − 1 
w 
+ φ[ (χ−1) κ+ T −χS ] 
w 
1 − 1 
w 
+ φ(χ−1)(κ−P) 
w 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠ . (141) 
ecause p CC ≤1 must hold true in Eq. (141) , we obtain 
(χ − 1)(R − κ) ≥ 0 . (142) ecause p DD ≥0 must hold true in Eq. (141) , we obtain 
(χ − 1)(κ − P ) ≥ 0 . (143) 
iven φ(χ − 1)  = 0 ( Section 3.2 ) and R > P , we ﬁnd that P ≤κ ≤R
ust hold true for Eqs. (142) and (143) to be simultaneously
atisﬁed. Therefore, using κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 we obtain
= −(κ − S) / (T − κ) < 0 . 
Finally, let us consider the case κ = R . By substituting κ = R
n Eq. (135) , we obtain wp CC (R − P ) = w (R − P ) , which implies
hat p CC = 1 . By combining this result with Eq. (117) , we ob-
ain p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1 , which implies that player X never uses
 DC and p DD . Therefore, p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1 speciﬁes a strat-
gy. By substituting p 0 = 1 in Eqs. (49) and (50) , we obtain
= −(R − S) / (T − R ) and κ = R, respectively, and the former
quality coincides with Eq. (117) when κ = R . Therefore, the
trategy p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1 is a special case of Eq. (51) . 
ppendix F. Case T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 
In this section, we assume 
 − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 (144) 
nd derive the set of strategies that satisfy Eq. (16) . 
By substituting Eq. (144) in Eq. (93) , we obtain 
(χ − 1)(κ − R ) [ (1 − w ) p 0 + wp DC ] = 0 . (145) 
q. (144) does not allow χ = 1 because substitution of χ = 1 in
q. (144) yields T = S, which contradicts Eq. (2) . Substitution of
= R in Eq. (144) yields χ = −(T − R ) / (R − S) . Alternatively, if we
et (1 − w ) p 0 + wp DC = 0 , we obtain p 0 = p DC = 0 . Therefore, we
onsider the following two subcases, i.e., subcase (C) speciﬁed by 
= R (146) 
nd 
= −T − R 
R − S , (147) 
nd subcase (D) speciﬁed by 
 − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 (148) 
nd 
p 0 = p DC = 0 . (149) 
1. Subcase (C): κ = R and χ = −(T − R ) / (R − S) 
By substituting Eqs. (146) and (147) in Eq. (94) , we obtain 
(1 − w ) [ 1 − w (p CC − p DC ) ] [ −p 0 (T + S − R − P ) + R − P ] ( T − S) 
R − S 
= 0 . (150) 
q. (150) does not hold true because 0 < w < 1, (R − P ) − p 0 (T + S −
 − P )  = 0 due to Eq. (101) , and 1 − w (p CC − p DC ) > 0 . Therefore
here is no solution in this case. 
2. Subcase (D): T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 and p 0 = p DC = 0 
By substituting Eqs. (148) and (149) in Eq. (91) , we obtain 
 (χ − 1) [ wp DD (κ − S)(χ + 1) + (1 − wp CD )(κ − P ) ] = 0 . (151) 
e obtain χ  = 1 because χ = 1 substituted in Eq. (148) yields
 = S, which contradicts Eq. (2) . Therefore, Eq. (151) implies 
p CD = 
wp DD (χ + 1)(κ − S) + κ − P 
w (κ − P ) (152) 
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 provided that κ  = P . We will deal with the case κ = P later in
this section. By substituting Eqs. (148) and (149) in Eq. (94) , we
obtain 
(χ − 1)(1 − w ) [ wp DD (κ − R ) + (1 − wp CC )(κ − P ) ] = 0 . (153)
Because 0 < w < 1 and χ  = 1, we obtain 
p CC = 
wp DD (κ − R ) + κ − P 
w (κ − P ) (154)
provided that κ  = P . Therefore, we obtain 
p = 
(
wp DD (κ − R ) + κ − P 
w (κ − P ) , 
wp DD (χ + 1)(κ − S) + κ − P 
w (κ − P ) , 0 , p DD 
)
, p 0 = 0 , (155)
where 0 ≤ p DD ≤1 is a necessary condition for the linear rela-
tionship between the payoff of the two players, i.e., Eq. (16) .
In fact, we substitute p CD given by Eq. (155) in p CD given by
Eq. (43) and use Eqs. (148) and (149) to ﬁnd that p CC , p DC , p DD 
given by Eq. (43) coincide with those given by Eq. (155) . Therefore,
Eq. (155) is a special case of ZD strategies given by Eq. (43) . 
Finally, let us consider the case κ = P . By substituting κ = P 
in Eq. (153) , we obtain wp DD (R − P ) = 0 , which implies that
p DD = 0 . By combining this result with Eq. (149) , we obtain
p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 , which implies that player X never uses
p CC and p CD . Therefore, p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 speciﬁes a strat-
egy. By substituting p 0 = 0 in Eqs. (49) and (50) , we obtain
χ = −(T − P ) / (P − S) and κ = P, respectively, and the former
equality coincides with Eq. (151) when κ = P . Therefore, the
strategy p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 is a special case of Eq. (51) . 
Appendix G. Minimum discount rate for χ< 0 
G1. ZD strategies with κ = P 
Let us consider Eq. (56) under φ < 0 and χ < 1. In this case, we
obtain Eqs. (57) –(59) , but with all the inequalities ﬂipped (i.e., ≥
instead of ≤ ). Then, we obtain 
(χ − 1) R −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
≥ 1 + χ
T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , (156)
1 + χ T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
≥ (χ − 1) 
R −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , (157)
χ + T − P 
P − S ≥
(χ − 1) R −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 , (158)
χ + T − P 
P − S ≥
1 + χ T −P 
P−S 
1 
w 
− 1 . (159)
Eqs. (156) –(159) yield 
χ ≤ −P − S + (1 − w )(R − P ) 
T − R + w (R − P ) < 0 , (160)
[ (R − P ) − (1 − w )(T − P ) ] χ ≤ R − P + (1 − w )(P − S) , (161)
[ w (R − P ) − (1 − w )(P − S) ] χ ≤ w (R − P ) + (1 − w )(T − P ) , 
(162)
[ −(P − S) + w (T − S) ] χ ≤ −w (P − S) + (1 − w )(T − P ) , (163)
respectively. When w is suﬃciently large, the coeﬃcients of χ
on the left-hand sides of Eqs. (161) –(163) are positive. In this
situation, Eqs. (160) –(163) are satisﬁed by a suﬃciently negative
large χ ( < 0). This result is consistent with the previously obtained
result ( Hilbe et al., 2015a ). 2. ZD strategies with κ = R 
In this section, we examine Eq. (75) –(77) under the assump-
ion that χ < 0. First, because d g 2 /d χ > 0, g 2 is discontinuous at
= −(R − S) / (T − R ) , and g 2 < 0 for −(R − S) / (T − R ) < χ < 0 ,
q. (76) is equivalent to 
< − R − S 
T − R (164)
f w ≥ (T − R ) / (T − P ) and 
R − S − w (P − S) 
−(T − R ) + w (T − P ) < χ < −
R − S 
T − R (165)
f w < (T − R ) / (T − P ) . Second, using Eq. (164) , d g 1 /d χ > 0,
nd that g 1 is discontinuous at χ = −(R − S) / (T − R ) , we ﬁnd
hat Eq. (164) implies Eq. (75) if w ≥ (T − R ) / (T − S) and that
q. (75) is equivalent to 
R − S − w (T − S) 
−(T − R ) + w (T − S) < χ < −
R − S 
T − R (166)
f w < (T − R ) / (T − S) . Third, because d( g 2 / g 1 )/d χ > 0, g 2 / g 1
s discontinuous at χ = −(T − R ) / (R − S) , and g 2 / g 1 < 0 for
(T − R ) / (R − S) < χ < 0 , Eq. (77) is equivalent to 
< −T − R 
R − S (167)
f w ≥ (P − S) / (R − S) and 
T − P − w (T − R ) 
−(P − S) + w (R − S) ≤ χ < −
T − R 
R − S (168)
f w < (P − S) / (R − S) . 
To summarize these results, if w ≥w c , generous strategies
ith 
< min 
(
− R − S 
T − R , −
T − R 
R − S 
)
< −1 (169)
xist because Eq. (169) yields Eqs. (75) –(77) . This result is consis-
ent with the previously obtained results ( Hilbe et al., 2015a ). Note
hat we have used Eq. (3) to derive the last inequality in Eq. (169) .
ven if w < w c , negative χ values that satisfy all the conditions,
.e., the set of equations out of Eqs. (164) –(168) , corresponding to
he given value of w , may exist. 
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